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THE SPIRIT OF THE LEARNED LAWS 
THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW. By Alan Watson. Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 1995. Pp. 235. 
 
THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW. By R.H. Helmholz. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996. Pp. 514. 
 
Reviewed by Charles J. Reid, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Montesquieu, when he wrote of the “spirit of the laws” two and a half 
centuries ago, meant to identify the relationship of a nation’s law with its 
national character.1 Necessarily implicating law in its three fundamental 
aspects—the natural or the moral, the historical, and the pragmatic or 
political2—Montesquieu strove for a synthetic understanding that would 
allow him to explain how and why legal systems and governments came 
into being, flourished, and passed away.3 
Alan Watson, probably the greatest living Roman legal historian, has 
striven for a similar understanding of law with this fine series on the 
“spirit of the law” published by the University of Georgia Press. Watson’s 
goal in producing this series is to provide not merely a review of the rules 
and regulations operative within particular legal systems, but to present the 
unity underlying a given system, thereby laying bare the philosophy, 
 * Dr. Charles J. Reid, Jr., holds degrees in law and canon law from the Catholic University of 
America and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. He teaches legal history and jurisprudence at the 
University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis. He would like to thank Kathleen Brady and 
John Witte, Jr., for helpful comments. 
 1. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. 28, at 
532-601 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1989) (1748). 
 2. On these three fundamental characteristics of all law and their integration, see Harold J. 
Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779 
(1988). 
 3. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at xliii:  
I began by examining men, and I believed that, amidst the infinite diversity of laws and 
mores, they were not led by their fancies alone. 
 I have set down the principles, and I have seen particular cases conform to them as if by 
themselves, the histories of all nations being but their consequences, and each particular law 
connecting with another law or dependent on a more general one. 
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history, and political process that brought it into being and sustained it 
throughout its natural life. 
Watson’s ambition with this series is global in reach. In addition to the 
two books under review in this essay, other volumes in the Spirit of the 
Laws series focus on Japanese law,4 traditional Chinese law,5 Islamic law,6 
and Biblical law.7 Fundamentally, the goal of the series is to capture the 
essence of the human experience of law, from the earliest available records 
onward. 
The two books under review seek to widen our understanding of the 
animating forces that led to the growth and development of the ancient 
Roman law and the medieval canon law.8 The two systems are related. 
Canon law, in its classical period of roughly the twelfth through fourteenth 
centuries, depended greatly on the revival of Roman legal studies that 
occurred at the University of Bologna and elsewhere in Western Europe 
beginning at the close of the eleventh century.9 The Roman law, for its 
part, awakened from a kind of dormancy due to this new scholarly interest 
and acquired a renewed life that carried it forward into the modern era. 
Together, Roman and canon law have exerted considerable influence over 
the shape of modern legal systems in Western Europe, in North and South 
America, and elsewhere in the world. It is therefore fitting that these two 
books be reviewed together in the pages of a law review dedicated to 
global studies. 
II. ALAN WATSON’S THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 
As a young scholar, Alan Watson published a series of important 
studies that transformed our knowledge of law in the Roman Republic.10 
He subsequently devoted years of his scholarly life to the study of the 
 4. JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998). 
 5. GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW (1995). 
 6. BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW (1998). 
 7. CALUM M. CARMICHAEL, THE SPIRIT OF BIBLICAL LAW (1996). 
 8. ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW (1995) [hereinafter ROMAN]; R.H. HELMHOLZ, 
THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW (1996) [hereinafter CANON]. 
 9. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 120-64 (1983). 
 10. See ALAN WATSON, THE CONTRACT OF MANDATE IN ROMAN LAW (1961); ALAN WATSON, 
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1965); ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF 
PERSONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1967); ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE 
LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1968); ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS (1970); ALAN 
WATSON, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW AROUND 200 B.C. (1971); ALAN WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE 
LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1974); ALAN WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES: PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY (1975). 
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nature of law and the phenomenon of legal change,11 and has, more 
recently, dedicated himself to understanding the historical events of the 
New Testament, particularly as related to law.12 In the midst of all of this 
scholarly output, Watson has continued to write deeply original 
monographs on aspects of Roman legal history as well as other topics.13 
In the work under review, Watson seeks to identify the time and 
circumstances of the birth of the “spirit” of Roman law. He identifies the 
time as the fifth century B.C. and the circumstances as the conflict between 
patricians and plebeians that gave rise to the ultimate adoption of the Law 
of the Twelve Tables. 
This conflict was one of the defining moments of the Roman Republic, 
as described by the chronicler of early Rome, Titus Livy. Tarquinius 
Superbus—Tarquin the Proud—had by the year 510 B.C. ruled for a 
quarter century and had worn out his welcome as Roman king. He had 
come to the throne in a bloody coup,14 and had maintained his hold on 
power through foreign wars and bloody purges.15 As Livy tells the story, 
the Tarquinian dynasty finally was toppled when Sextus Tarquinius, the 
Proud Man’s son, raped Lucretia, the daughter of Spurius Lucretius, and 
the wife of Tarquinius Collatinus, a near relative of the king, but one who 
had fallen afoul of him.16 Lucretia, to preserve her honor, revealed to her 
father and husband that she had been raped, swore her men to avenge her, 
and then committed suicide.17 Collatinus and Lucretius, joined by Lucius 
Iunius Brutus, promptly brought about an uprising, exiled Tarquin the 
Proud and his family, and installed in place of the king two consuls who 
were to share all the traditional power of governance.18 Henceforward, 
 11. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974); 
ALAN WATSON, THE NATURE OF LAW (1977); ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985); 
ALAN WATSON, FAILURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1988); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL ORIGINS AND 
LEGAL CHANGE (1991). 
 12. See ALAN WATSON, JESUS AND THE JEWS: THE PHARISAIC TRADITION IN JOHN (1995); 
ALAN WATSON, THE TRIAL OF JESUS (1995); ALAN WATSON, THE TRIAL OF STEPHEN: THE FIRST 
CHRISTIAN MARTYR (1996); ALAN WATSON, JESUS: A PROFILE (1998). 
 13. See ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW (1981); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN 
SLAVE LAW (1987); ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS (1989); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN 
LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1991); ALAN WATSON, THE STATE, LAW, AND RELIGION: PAGAN 
ROME (1992); ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1992); ALAN WATSON, ANCIENT LAW AND MODERN UNDERSTANDING: AT THE 
EDGES (1998); ALAN WATSON, LAW OUT OF CONTEXT (2000). 
 14. See TITUS LIVY, AB URBE CONDITA [FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE CITY] bk. I.46-48. 
 15. Id. at bk. I.49-57. 
 16. Id. at bk. I.57-58. 
 17. Id. at bk. I.58. 
 18. Id. at bk. I.59-60. See also MICHAEL CRAWFORD, THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 22-23 (2d ed. 1993) 
(describing the nature of consular power). 
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consuls were to be elected annually by the leading elements of Roman 
society, with only rare exceptions. 
Livy recounts that the Roman Republic that grew up in succeeding 
years was one dedicated to political liberty, at least for those who 
controlled the levers of state power.19 Indeed, it would be a struggle over 
who should be allowed a say in the exercise of that power that, Alan 
Watson argues, set in motion a train of events that conferred on Roman 
law its distinctive spirit.20 
In early Rome, a large social gulf separated patricians—the Roman 
ruling class—from the plebeians, or common folk. Livy, in describing the 
social origins of the plebeians, stated that they were “nomads and refugees 
from their own nation” unfit to participate in governance, at least during 
the monarchy.21 Regardless of their social origins, by the middle decades 
of the fifth century B.C., sufficient numbers of plebeians had acquired the 
wealth and status needed to make a claim to share in the governance of the 
state.22 This claim, Watson notes, quickly resolved itself into an insistence 
that plebeians be given a share in the lawmaking function.23 
This conflict coincided with a short-lived experiment in Roman 
governance. In 452 B.C., Rome briefly abandoned the consular system 
(whereby two men shared the full authority of the state) in favor of 
government by “ten men” (decemviri).24 It was precisely at this time that 
the struggle over the law reached a climax. A senatorial delegation had 
been sent to Athens two years before to study the laws of Solon.25 The 
decemviri now redacted the recommendations into actual legislation and 
forwarded the finished document to the comitia centuriata for 
ratification.26 As originally conceived, the laws consisted of ten tables, but 
 19. LIVY, supra note 14, at bk. II.1. 
Liberi iam hinc populi Romani res pace belloque gestas, annuos magistratus imperiaque 
legum potentiora quam hominum peragam. Quae libertas ut laetior esset, proximi regis 
superbia fecerat [I shall recount here the deeds of the free Roman people in peace and in war, 
their annual magistracies, and the imperial reign of their laws, more powerful than men. 
Which liberty was made more blessed because of the overbearing of the last king]. 
Id. 
 20. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 34-37. 
 21. LIVY, supra note 14, at bk. II.1. 
 22. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 35. 
 23. Id. at 36. 
 24. See LIVY, supra note 14, at bk. III.33. 
 25. Id. at bk. III.31. 
 26. Id. at bk. III.34. On the comitia centuriata, one of the earliest and most comprehensive of the 
Roman popular assemblies, see ANDREW LINTOTT, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 55-
61 (1999).  
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subsequently another two were added, and the final collection came to be 
known as the Law of the Twelve Tables.27 
“Such were the historical events,” Watson asserts, “that . . . determined 
the spirit of Roman law.”28 The law that emerged from the comitia 
centuriata fundamentally reflected the wants and prejudices of the 
patrician class.29 The patrician class, furthermore, maintained a monopoly 
over the interpretation of the law that would last for centuries.30 These 
basic social facts Watson takes as fundamental for understanding both the 
topics that Roman law addressed and the matters that are omitted from 
legal analysis.31  
The essentially patrician character of the law caused it, first and 
foremost, to be weighted heavily in favor of private law concerns at the 
expense of public law, understood as the law establishing and dilineating 
governmental powers and responsibilities.32 Furthermore, the desire of the 
patricians to control the state religion led paradoxically to the pronounced 
secular character of Roman law.33 It was not that the Romans were 
unconcerned with matters of religion, but rather that the leading classes, 
who controlled the rituals of the state religion and their interpretation, had 
concluded that it was best to exclude religious law “as a subject for which 
the plebs were unfit.”34 
Watson also emphasizes the importance of legal interpretation 
remaining in the hands of the patrician class.35 Pomponius, whose 
historical account of the Twelve Tables is preserved in the Digest, records 
that following the adoption of this law, the College of Pontiffs retained the 
right of interpretation and would designate one of its members every year 
to explicate the law of civil actions.36 The College of Pontiffs, or priests, 
itself also was charged with the task of interpreting the Roman state 
religion.37 Membership among the College was the prerogative of the 
aristocratic classes; it was held for life and often was exercised in tandem 
with civil magistracies by those eager for advancement.38 Watson explains 
 27. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 37. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 37-38. 
 30. Id. at 37. 
 31. Id. at 37-38. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 38-39. 
 34. Id. at 38. 
 35. Id. at 37-39. 
 36. DIG. 1.2.6 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985). 
 37. See LINTOTT, supra note 26, at 183-85. 
 38. Id. at 183. 
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the significance of this retention of interpretive responsibilities by the 
leading men: 
The original role of interpretation given to the pontiffs and the 
choice of one of their number to give authoritative rulings are the 
basis of two other characteristic features of the system: the 
importance subsequently attached by gentlemen [i.e., the jurists] to 
the giving of legal opinions, and the acceptance by the state of the 
individual’s important role in lawmaking. Because to become one 
of the (originally) four pontiffs was an important step in a political 
career and because giving authoritative rulings in law was a 
significant pontifical function, it was valuable for a gentleman to 
have legal knowledge and provide legal opinions . . . When the 
College of Pontiffs lost its monopoly of interpretation, tradition 
ensured that men of the same class regarded the task as important.39 
Much of the remainder of Watson’s book explores and explains the 
singular qualities of Roman law by reference to these original features. 
Gaius’ Institutes, dating to the second century A.D., proclaimed three basic 
divisions to law: persons, actions, and things.40 These are preeminently 
private law concerns. There is little room here for concerns of a public law 
nature. Indeed, although Gaius’ work makes mention of the powers of the 
popular assemblies, the praetors, and the emperors, little space is given to 
analyzing them in any detail. We learn merely that the law recognized 
distinctions between the force of laws (leges), plebiscites (plebiscita), 
opinions of the senate (senatusconsulta), and imperial edicts (edicta) 
issued in the emperor’s capacity as the ultimate sovereign.41 We learn that 
the decrees of the praetors count as a source of law, and that imperial 
governors and quaestors could exercise these powers in the provinces.42 
Other mentions of public law are even more limited and incidental.43 
The other principal didactic work of Roman law, Justinian’s Institutes, 
provides little more in the way of analysis of public law. The Institutes 
declared in Book I, Title 1, that legal study consisted of two subjects: (1) 
 39. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 39. 
 40. Id. at 42. 
 41. See G. INST. 1.2-6 (E.A. Whittuck ed., Edward Poste trans., 4th ed. 1904). 
 42. Id. at 1.6-7. 
 43. Watson cites to two brief mentions of public property that occur in the course of Gaius’ 
treatment of the law of things. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 43-44. Watson adds: “Public property is 
not further described: what it is, how it is constituted or acquired, particular privileges attaching to it, 
its alienability or otherwise, responsibility for its upkeep, actions against violators of it—these topics 
are entirely missing.” Id. at 43. 
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public law, which pertained to the Roman state, and (2) private law, which 
looked toward the welfare of individuals.44 Further distinguishing between 
written and unwritten law, the Institutes went on in a few paragraphs of 
Book I, Title 2, to define the scope of plebiscites, senatusconsulta, 
imperial decrees, the edicts of magistrates, and the responses of jurists.45 
The remainder of the four books were dedicated to private law. Watson 
notes that of the other works of Justinian, the Digest, consisting of 
excerpts from the principal jurists of the second and third centuries A.D., 
and the Code, consisting of imperial decrees from the second through fifth 
centuries, are somewhat more detailed, but that even these works make 
only infrequent mention of public law concerns while private law matters 
predominate.46 
A second enduring characteristic of Roman law that is traceable to the 
early conflict between classes that produced the Law of the Twelve Tables 
is its secular quality.47 Watson takes the example of marriage and divorce 
to illustrate this point.48 Marriage and divorce, in pre-Christian Roman 
law, was preeminently a matter for the parties themselves to arrange. 
Marriage was made by the consent of the parties, although typically the 
head of the household had much influence over the choice of the marriage 
partner.49 Since marriage was brought about by choice, it also could be 
dissolved by choice.50 
Christianity, however, ushered in a far different view of the marriage 
relationship. Where Roman law and practice viewed marriage as a private 
matter affecting the management of the household (conceived largely in 
economic terms),51 Christian theology, by the fourth and fifth centuries, 
had come to define marriage as an indissoluble union that served to fulfill 
 44. See J. INST. 1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1962) (“Huius studii duae sunt 
positiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum ius est, quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum, 
quod ad singulorum utilitatem pertinet”). 
 45. See id. 1.2.3-9. 
 46. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 46-47. 
 47. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
 48. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 46-47. 
 49. See PERCY ELLWOOD CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 55-57 (2d ed. 1969). 
 50. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 38-39 
(1987). As a matter of social practice, divorce was rare in the Roman Republic, particularly early in 
Republican history. The first recorded divorce was that of Spurius Carvilius Ruga. See Alan Watson, 
The Divorce of Carvilius Ruga, 33 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 38 (1965). 
 51. “In classical Latin, the word familia carries equivalent meanings. It designates everything 
and everybody under the authority [patria potestas] of the household head.” See DAVID HERLIHY, 
MEDIEVAL HOUSEHOLDS 2 (1985). 
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certain spiritual ends, including the creation of an unbreakable union that 
represented Christ’s own love for the Church.52 
Despite this vastly changed understanding of the meaning and purpose 
of marriage, the Roman lawyers of the later Christian Empire retained the 
old understanding of matrimony as a dissoluble consensual relationship. 
Justinian’s Institutes was silent on the subject of divorce.53 Constantine, 
Roman Emperor and Christian convert, placed restrictions on the right to 
divorce,54 but his legislation and successive enactments by later emperors, 
it has been persuasively demonstrated, were not principally motivated by a 
Christian vision of marriage.55 “From Constantine to Justin II there was in 
Roman divorce law no assertion that marriage was indissoluble or 
irrevocable by the law of God, nature or man; no assertion that marriage 
was a mystery or a sacrament; no assertion that a valid first marriage was 
any barrier to a valid second marriage.”56 The secular ideal, established 
early in Republican history, still can be found exerting its influence many 
centuries later, in the very different context of a Christianizing empire. 
Watson also explores in depth two other enduring features of Roman 
law: (1) the continuing responsibility of jurists to interpret, and thus to 
make, the law, and (2) the isolation of legal analysis from other social, 
political, economic or other considerations. From an early stage in Roman 
Republican history, jurists enjoyed a “right of responding” (ius 
respondendi) which actually allowed them to make law by means of 
cogently reasoned opinions.57 Although the emperor Augustus narrowed 
this right and made its possession an imperial prerogative that only he or 
his successors could bestow, he took this step in order to preserve the old 
Republican practice.58 “Augustus’ idea was that the responsum of an 
authorized jurist should carry higher auctoritas. . . .”59 
 52. St. Augustine, for instance, wrote of an unbreakable “order of love” (ordo caritatis) that 
prevailed between husband and wife, and declared this fidelity to be greater even than bodily health. 
See ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, DE SANCTA VIRGINITATE secs. 3-4 (P.G. Walsh ed. & 
trans., 2001). 
 53. Book I, Title 10, which addresses marriage, deals with issues of eligibility to marry as well as 
impediments to marriage, particularly among close family members. That divorce was contemplated as 
an option is revealed incidentally, as in the provision that offspring from a former spouse’s second 
marriage following divorce should not count as stepchildren. See J. INST. 1.10.9. 
 54. See THE THEODOSIAN CODE AND NOVELS, AND THE SIRMONDIAN CONSTITUTIONS 3.16.1 
(Clyde Pharr trans., 1952). 
 55. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Novel 22, in THE BOND OF MARRIAGE 41, 71 (William W. Bassett 
ed., 1968). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See FRITZ SCHULZ, ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 112 (1946). 
 58. Id. at 112-13. 
 59. Id. at 113. 
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It is the survival of this sort of institution that Watson finds in need of 
explanation. “[F]or a state to give weight to opinions expressed outside of 
some official context is startling.”60 It is all the more startling, Watson 
continues, in a secular legal system.61  
It is not in the least surprising in a system based on religion, such as 
Jewish or Islamic law, that expounding the law will bring great 
prestige and attract scholars. Law as religion is law as truth, and to 
be recognized as uncovering the truth is always to obtain prestige.62 
Once again, Watson traces an institution both fundamental and peculiar 
to Roman law to the particular circumstances of its birth. Interpretation of 
the law had belonged to the College of Pontiffs and, even after this task 
had become the responsibility of others, it was still the prerogative of the 
aristocracy.63 This prerogative endured: “Tradition dies hard and even 
when this monopoly of interpretation [held by the Pontiffs] was ended, 
skill in giving legal opinions was a mark of great distinction, and juristic 
views were accepted by the state for the development of the law.”64 In 
addition, the survival of this prerogative explains other peculiarities of 
Roman law, such as the low status accorded to judicial opinions: 
In other systems judicial decisions may contribute to legal 
development in various notable ways: a judgment may be treated as 
binding precedent, or two or three similar judgments may be seen as 
marking a tradition from which judges will not readily depart, or the 
judgments of a court may be regarded as the best evidence of what 
the custom is. But in Rome, judges would follow the interpretation 
of jurists, who themselves were the best, authoritative, source of 
evidence of the law.65 
 60. ROMAN, supra note 8, at 57. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. See also Francis de Zulueta, The Science of 
Law, in THE LEGACY OF ROME 192-96 (Cyril Bailey ed., 1923). 
 64. See ROMAN, supra note 8, at 58. 
 65. Id. at 60. Watson continues:  
Still, in any society judicial decisions must have some importance, even if only as statements 
of what the law seems to be. It then becomes significant that so little mention is made of them 
at Rome. There is nothing at all in the legal sources, whether juristic, statutory, or rulings of 
the emperors, and in the literary sources we have only the slightest indications that orators 
might refer to previous decisions in their speeches. 
Id. 
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Retention by the aristocracy of the responsibility of authentically 
interpreting the law led to yet another peculiar feature of Roman legal 
science: its intellectual isolation from outside influences. As Watson puts 
it, “[w]hole legal institutions, such as usufruct, which must have had 
particular social and economic implications, are set out with no hint on the 
face of the texts of their social realities.”66 
Watson pays particular attention to the impact this “legal isolationism” 
had on patterns of reasoning about the law. Legal reasoning was internal to 
itself. One might call it conceptualistic, or even formalistic. It was 
improper to introduce factors external to the law, such as economic or 
political considerations, when arguing about a particular rule, and whether 
it should be applied in a given case or extended to an analogous set of 
circumstances, or whether it should be limited or avoided altogether.67 
Watson provides numerous examples of this type of reasoning. One 
such example might be selected for examination. An excerpt from Paulus, 
found in the Digest, preserves a debate between members of the Sabinian 
and Proculan schools regarding whether a contract of sale is formed where 
the medium of exchange consists of things rather than money.68 Sabinus 
and his followers asserted that such an exchange did amount to a contract 
of sale, while the Proculans maintained that it did not.69 
In support of their contentions, each side cited competing passages 
from Homer.70 Citing to the Iliad, Sabinus and his disciple Cassius sought 
to justify the extension of the contract of sale to cover cases where the 
exchange was in something other than money.71 “The long-haired 
Achaeans,” Homer recorded, “procured wine, some for bronze, some for 
gleaming iron, some for hides, some for whole cattle, and some for 
slaves.”72 This passage was countered by Proculus and his follower Nerva, 
who cited to a competing passage from Homer. In Book VI of the Iliad, 
 66. Id. at 64. 
 67. Id. at 66. 
 68. See DIG., supra note 36, at 18.1.1.1. The Sabinians and the Proculans were the two major 
schools of thought in ancient Roman jurisprudence. Peter Stein sees the two schools as distinct from 
one another on questions of legal method, with the Proculans favoring “a strict, objective interpretation 
of the words used” in statutes, contracts, or other legal documents, and the Sabinians endorsing “a 
looser and less rigid approach to the interpretation of texts.” See Peter Stein, Interpretation and Legal 
Reasoning in Roman Law, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1539, 1545-46 (1995). Cf. Peter Stein, The Two 
Schools of Jurists in the Early Roman Principate, 31 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 8 (1972) (setting out Stein’s 
arguments at greater length). 
 69. See DIG., supra note 36, at 18.1.1.1. 
 70. Id. See also David Daube, The Three Quotations from Homer in Digest 18.1.1.1, in 1 
COLLECTED STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW 341 (David Cohen & Dieter Simon eds., 1991). 
 71. See DIG., supra note 36, at 18.1.1.1. 
 72. HOMER, ILIAD bk. VII, 472-75. Cf. Daube, supra note 70, at 341 (translating the passage). 
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Glaucus, his judgment blinded by Zeus, is recorded as exchanging his 
golden armor for the bronze armor of Diomedes.73 The Greek verb 
ameibo, used by the Poet, carried the sense of trading, or bartering, but not 
of buying or selling.74 In reply, Sabinus cited to a phrase repeated at 
several points in the Odyssey: “He purchased with his possessions.”75 
Watson’s point in reviewing this debate is to call attention to what was 
omitted by the jurists debating this issue.76 Agreements that could be 
classified as contracts of sale were subject to “very satisfactory . . . 
contractual remedies. The defendant who lost his case would be adjudged 
to pay the plaintiff a sum of money equal to what he ought to give or do in 
accordance with good faith.”77 At the time this debate occurred, however, 
there was no contract for barter, and an aggrieved party  
who had performed his part of the bargain would be restricted to 
using the general action known as condictio, specifically on the 
ground of “causa data causa non secuta” (a consideration given but 
no consideration followed). All that this remedy would grant him 
would be a sum of money equivalent in value to what he had 
given.78 
In fact, Watson makes clear, what the Sabinians were advocating was an 
expansion of the remedy available in a contract of sale to cover situations 
“where one thing was promised for another and neither prestation was to 
be in coined money.”79 But no justification for such an expansion was 
offered on social or economic grounds.80 “The only explanation is that 
arguments from economic and social realities were not acceptable.”81 
Much of the remainder of Watson’s volume develops or qualifies these 
basic themes. We learn, for instance, that the jurists, although their 
 73. HOMER, supra note 72, at bk. VI, 232-36. 
 74. See HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, 1 A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 80 (9th ed. 
1940). 
 75. DIG., supra note 36, at 18.1.1.1 (citing to HOMER, ODYSSEY bk. I, 430; bk. XIV, 115, 452). 
 76. ROMAN, supra note 8, at 66. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. Watson connects this isolation to the jurists’ origins in the College of Pontiffs:  
Though the pontiffs . . . kept religion out of law and did not make legal forms so rigid as 
those of religion, still they did, probably subconsciously, introduce pontifical modes of 
reasoning into their interpretation of private law. . . . One cannot permit the answer to an issue 
of sacred law (law as truth) to turn upon an argument of equity or justice, usefulness or 
economic efficiency, or advantage to the state. 
Id. at 82. 
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reasoning was largely self-contained, were not altogether divorced from 
social realities. They were willing to make adjustments in the law of theft 
and contract of mandate when circumstances warranted, but their method 
was to make exceptions to otherwise general rules.82 The seeming 
paradox—and Watson stresses that it is only a seeming paradox83—of a 
body of law that featured both a high degree of conceptualization and a 
lack of systematization also is explained by reference to the peculiar 
origins of the Twelve Tables and the interpretive monopoly enjoyed by the 
College of Pontiffs. The Pontiffs were charged with the task of 
interpretation. They were neither innovators nor systematizers.84 The 
jurists who succeeded the College shared in this prejudice and this 
limitation of functions.85 Yet another seeming paradox—the Roman 
reluctance to define terms and to resolve definitively controverted points 
of law—also is resolved by reference to the historical origins of the juristic 
profession.86 As the jurists were fundamentally interpreters of law, they 
wished to see their ideas triumph because of their persuasiveness and inner 
logic. Where consensus could not be attained, it was preferable to allow a 
dispute to linger than to seek definitive statutory resolution from the 
emperor.87 
Watson’s book is an extraordinarily important work by the leading 
scholar in the field. It is a triumph of massive knowledge of the sources in 
combination with profound historical imagination. Seeming anomalies 
about Roman law—its lack of concern with public law, its seemingly 
secular nature, the leading role played by jurists, its simultaneous high 
degree of conceptualization and lack of system—all are explained by the 
peculiar circumstances of its birth. For those who wish to understand the 
 82. Id. at 98-110. 
 83. According to Watson, a simultaneous lack of systematization and the presence of 
conceptualization  
[D]o not present a paradox. The conceptualization was the result of the jurists working within 
the Roman system of actions: the boundaries of an institution had to be delineated so that it 
could be known whether an action (or other remedy), and which action, would lie. This was 
very much within the scope of the jurists’ primary interest, interpretation. 
Id. at 146. 
 84. Id. at 123. 
 85. Id.  
[T]he Romans were not interested in systematizing the law, nor in law reform, nor in legal 
innovation as such. But they were interested in legal interpretation. And the historical reason 
for that takes us back almost to the beginning of this book, namely, the granting of a 
monopoly of interpreting the civil law to the College of Pontiffs . . .  
Id. 
 86. Id. at 146-57. 
 87. Id. at 155. 
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spirit animating the birth and development of Roman law, Watson’s book 
is indispensable reading.  
III. R.H. HELMHOLZ’S THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 
R.H. Helmholz is among the greatest of living historians of medieval 
canon law. After earning a Bachelor of Law at Harvard, he did graduate 
work under the direction of John Noonan at the University of California, 
Berkeley. His dissertation, examining procedure in matrimonial cases in 
medieval England (published by Cambridge University Press in 1974), is a 
model of exacting scholarly research, exploring the application of 
canonistic marital doctrine to lived reality.88 Following the completion of 
this work, Helmholz embarked on a long series of articles to demonstrate 
the deep interconnections shared by the canon law and the English 
common law. Collected in book form in 1987, Helmholz’s work 
persuasively shows that canon law did indeed constitute part of the law of 
England prior to the Reformation.89 
In more recent works, Helmholz has continued to engage in path-
breaking studies of canon law. In The Bible in the Service of the Canon 
Law, he examined a surprisingly neglected corner of medieval canonistic 
research—the central role played by Scripture in shaping the canon law.90 
In an article in a Festschrift dedicated to Robert Summers, Helmholz 
studied the formation of the doctrine of prescription, an important aspect 
of the canon law of property roughly analogous to adverse possession in 
the common-law tradition.91 Recently, he even has begun exploring the 
relationships of English canon law with the canon law of other regions of 
medieval Europe, such as Spain.92 Finally, in The Roman Law of 
Blackmail, Helmholz studied the ancient and medieval development of 
this crime.93 
In his recent work, Helmholz has continued as well to study the 
flowering of canon law on the peculiar soil of Britain, both before and 
after the Protestant Reformation. In Magna Carta and the ius commune, 
 88. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1974). 
 89. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987). 
 90. See R.H. Helmholz, The Bible in the Service of the Canon Law, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557 
(1995). 
 91. See R.H. Helmholz, Legal Formalism, Substantive Policy, and the Creation of a Canon Law 
of Prescription, in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND NORMATIVE RATIONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 265 (Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994). 
 92. See R.H. Helmholz, Spanish and English Ecclesiastical Courts (1300-1550), in 28 STUDIA 
GRATIANA 415 (Peter Linehan ed., 1998). 
 93. See R.H. Helmholz, The Roman Law of Blackmail, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (2001). 
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Helmholz was the first to investigate in a systematic fashion the powerful 
influence Roman and canon law exerted on the drafting of this 
foundational document of Anglo-American constitutional history.94 In his 
contribution to the volume Canon Law in Protestant Lands, and his book 
Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, Helmholz examined the 
survival of canonistic modes of reasoning in Protestant England.95 A series 
of shorter studies considered specialized aspects of this relationship, such 
as “children’s rights” and sex offenses.96 A pair of important studies assess 
the contributions of other great scholars to the development of a 
historiography of Western law.97 Finally, in an important work of 
distillation, Helmholz explored various ways in which the law of England 
and the ius commune, the “common law” of Europe, interacted over the 
centuries.98 He closes this work by endorsing the idea of a Western legal 
tradition, embracing both England and the Continent, which has run 
continuously from the twelfth century to our own, although it has 
“admitted a good deal of variety within it.”99 
Helmholz’s scholarship recently has branched into yet other areas of 
inquiry. Two articles consider the contribution of the common law of 
Europe—the learned canon and Roman law that took root in the twelfth 
through sixteenth centuries—to the development of the rule against self-
incrimination, mistakenly thought by many Anglo-American lawyers and 
judges to be a uniquely common-law institution that developed in reaction 
to the oppressive techniques of Continental law.100 The second of these 
 94. See R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999). 
 95. See R.H. Helmholz, Canon Law in Post-Reformation England, in CANON LAW IN 
PROTESTANT LANDS 203 (R.H. Helmholz ed., 1992); R.H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN 
REFORMATION ENGLAND (1990). 
 96. See R.H. Helmholz, And Were There Children’s Rights in Early Modern England? The 
Canon Law and “Intra-Family” Violence in England, 1400-1640, 1 INT’L J. OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
23 (1993); R.H. Helmholz, Harboring Sexual Offenders: Ecclesiastical Courts and Controlling 
Misbehavior, 37 J. BRITISH STUD. 258 (1998). Another important essay of Helmholz’s on the 
relationship of English Protestant thinkers and the larger pre-Reformation legal tradition is R.H. 
Helmholz, Richard Hooker and the European ius commune, 6 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 4 (2001). 
 97. See R.H. Helmholz, The Character of the Western Legal Tradition: Assessing Harold 
Berman’s Contributions to Legal History, in THE INTEGRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE OF HAROLD J. 
BERMAN 29 (Howard O. Hunter ed., 1996); R.H. Helmholz, The Learned Laws in ‘Pollock and 
Maitland,’ in THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: CENTENARY ESSAYS ON ‘POLLOCK AND MAITLAND’ 
145 (John Hudson ed., 1996). 
 98. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE IUS COMMUNE IN ENGLAND: FOUR STUDIES (2001). 
 99. Id. at 240. 
 100. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the 
European ius commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990); R.H. Helmholz, The Privilege and the Ius 
Commune: The Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 17 (R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997). 
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articles appeared in an anthology that Helmholz himself edited and that 
comprehensively reviews the history of this privilege,101 a volume that in 
only four years has been cited twice by the U.S. Supreme Court.102 
Helmholz also has conducted important research into the history and 
function of property law in the Western world. Two articles explore the 
actual behavior of the courts when confronted with claims of adverse 
possession.103 Other articles deal with judicial enforcement of joint 
tenancies,104 the law of property that has been lost and found,105 and the 
liability of bailees.106 Helmholz has distilled much of this learning into 
case book form with the publication of Fundamentals of Property Law.107 
Furthermore, a second casebook of a very different sort puts on display 
Helmholz’s gifts as a careful student of arcane legal manuscripts. Select 
Cases on Defamation to 1600 seeks “to discover, and to present, the action 
as it appeared in ordinary civil litigation.”108 An historical introduction of 
over one hundred pages explains the rise of defamation as a cause of 
action, drawn from an amalgam of royal law and canon law, as mediated 
through the particular circumstances of English legal development. 
Helmholz is also the rarest of legal historians in yet another respect: his 
work has been taken seriously by the courts. Helmholz’s contention that 
the common law’s failure to provide support in bastardy cases was 
because this responsibility belonged to the ecclesiastical courts has been 
cited by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the course of its 
discussion of the rights of illegitimate children under state law.109 His 
historical account of the canonistic origins of the grand jury similarly have 
 101. See Helmholz, The Privilege and the Ius Commune, supra note 100. 
 102. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 52-53 (2000); Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 
66 (2000). 
 103. See R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 NW. 
L. REV. 1221 (1986); R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor 
Cunningham, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 65 (1986). 
 104. See R.H. Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint-Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. 
REV. 1 (1998). 
 105. See R.H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 313 
(1983). 
 106. See R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform 
Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97 (1992). 
 107. See BARLOW BURKE, ANN M. BURKHART, & R.H. HELMHOLZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PROPERTY LAW (1999). 
 108. See SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600 (R.H. Helmholz ed., 1985). 
 109. See C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 368 n.3 (Mass. 1990). Cf. R.H. Helmholz, Support Orders, 
Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REV. 
431 (1977) (setting out Helmholz’s evidence). A Texas court that cites to this study seems confused as 
to its implications for understanding the evolution of the common law. See In the Interest of J.W.T., 
872 S.W.2d 189, 191, 191 n.8 (Tex. 1994). 
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been referred to by the courts,110 as has his treatment of lost chattels.111 
In The Spirit of Classical Canon Law, one of four large works of 
synthesis on canon law published in the 1990s,112 Helmholz seeks to 
discover the animating principle of canon law through a rigorously 
inductive method: 
It occurred to me that it might be possible to choose a number of 
subjects covered by the classical canon law and work through at 
least their most salient features. If the parts chosen were diverse 
enough and if they could be taken from representative areas of the 
law, the more general nature of the canonical system might emerge 
from their cumulation. Some overall conclusions about the canon 
law might become apparent. In other words, the choice of several 
suitable areas from the canonical system might uncover enough 
about the nature of the larger subject to make the project 
worthwhile.113 
Helmholz has succeeded in this ambition in a thorough and 
comprehensive way. His work is both an elegant and a learned summary 
of research in a number of fields of investigation within the discipline of 
medieval canon law, and a remarkably fruitful effort at uncovering its 
inner spirit. Before evaluating Helmholz’s work, however, a few words are 
in order about what is meant by the term “classical canon law.” 
The essential precondition to the birth and development of classical 
canon law was the Gregorian Revolution of the late eleventh century.114 
The Church as late as the middle decades of the eleventh century was in 
large parts of Europe dominated by lay authority.115 This was the case 
even in Rome. Emperor Henry III, who was an ally of the reform 
movement then taking hold in ecclesiastical circles, took for granted in the 
 110. See Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 n.3 (D. Utah 1994); State v. 
Doliner, 475 A.2d 552, 556 (N.J. 1984); Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 378 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, 
J., dissenting). Cf. R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 613 (1983). 
 111. See In re Seizure of $82,000 More or Less, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 2000). Cf. 
Helmholz, supra note 105. 
 112. See CANON, supra note 8. See also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW (1995); 
JEAN GAUDEMET, ÉGLISE ET CITÉ: HISTOIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE (1994); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
CANONS AND CANONISTS IN CONTEXT (1997). Cf. Charles J. Reid, Jr. & John Witte, Jr., In the Steps 
of Gratian: Writing the History of Canon Law in the 1990s, 48 EMORY L.J. 647 (1999) (evaluating 
these works). 
 113. See CANON, supra note 8, at xi-xii. 
 114. See generally BERMAN, supra note 9. 
 115. See COLIN MORRIS, THE PAPAL MONARCHY: THE WESTERN CHURCH FROM 1050 TO 1250, 
21-28 (1989). 
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1040s that it was his responsibility to make and unmake popes.116 
These arrangements were shattered during the pontificate of Gregory 
VII. Hildebrand, who was elected pope in 1073 and took the name 
Gregory VII, was himself a member of the papal reform party,117 and soon 
tangled with the German Emperor Henry IV over who was responsible for 
filling the vacant see of Milan.118 Beginning in 1075 the controversy 
turned into violent civil war that affected both Germany and Italy.119 
Larger issues also came to be implicated. The Gregorian party sought to 
achieve the libertas ecclesiae—the liberty of the Church from secular 
domination.120 Indeed, some theorists among the pro-papal party even 
sought to subordinate the secular to the ecclesiastical powers.121 
Conventionally, the classical period is said to have begun in 1140, 
sixty-five years after the commencement of the Gregorian Revolution, 
with the appearance of Gratian’s Concordia discordantium canonum 
(“Concord of Discordant Canons”), a title soon changed to the Decretum 
(“Decree”).122 This work represented a qualitative advance over the 
collections that had gone before.123 Its basic method was dialectical.124 By 
questions, answers, careful distinctions, and shades of contrast, Gratian 
sought to harmonize a thousand-year tradition of ecclesiastical law and 
regulation that featured some large discordances.125 
Gratian’s Decretum found a receptive audience. Within a few years, it 
was being studied and commented upon in all corners of Europe: from 
northern Italy, to France, to Anglo-Norman England, to the German 
 116. See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 93-94. 
 117. On the Gregorian platform, see BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-
1300, 45-52 (1964). 
 118. Id. at 53. 
 119. Id. at 53-55. 
 120. See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 118. 
 121. Gregory VII was himself a strong proponent of such a subordination. In his Dictatus Papae 
(“Sayings of the Pope”), he included such propositions as: “That the pope alone is the one whose feet 
are to be kissed by all princes;” “[t]hat he may depose emperors;” “[t]hat no judgment of his may be 
revised by anyone, and that he alone may revise [the judgments] of all;” and “[t]hat he may absolve 
subjects of unjust men from their [oath of] fealty.” Id. at 96. 
 122. The Decretum is reproduced in 1 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI (Emil Friedberg ed., 1879). Cf. 
CANON, supra note 8, at 6-10. For a review of what can be known about Gratian’s life and career, see 
John T. Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the Father of the Systematic Study 
of Canon Law, 35 TRADITIO 145 (1979). 
 123. Helmholz explains Gratian’s project: “[Gratian] organized the texts around discrete topics or 
questions, and he analyzed them in order to harmonize them where they seemed to conflict. He thereby 
brought ‘harmony to dissonance.’” See CANON, supra note 8, at 8. 
 124. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Catholic Law School—A.D. 1150, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1189 
(1998); Stephan Kuttner, The Father of the Science of Canon Law, 1 JURIST 2 (1941). 
 125. See STEPHAN KUTTNER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN INTERPRETATION OF MEDIEVAL 
CANON LAW (1960). 
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Rhineland.126 The school of commentators that dedicated itself to this 
work has become known as the “decretists,” or literally, “students of the 
Decretum.”127 They saw their goal as twofold: (1) to illuminate the 
seeming inconsistencies and ambiguities that might be found in Gratian’s 
work, and (2) to fill in gaps discernible in Gratian’s tome.128 Some of these 
writers have exercised enormous influence on the shape of western 
constitutionalism, even though their works are barely known today outside 
of a select circle of specialists. Rufinus (ca. 1160), for instance, played a 
crucial role in the development of the western vocabulary of natural 
rights,129 while Huguccio (fl. 1188-1190) contributed greatly to the 
creation of other basic structures of constitutional thought.130 
By the latter decades of the twelfth century, one also witnessed an 
exponential growth in the numbers of decretal letters issued by the 
popes.131 Decretal letters were literally decrees of the pope. Modeled on 
the old Roman law rescript,132 decretal letters featured elements both of 
case law—they often were intended to resolve pending litigation—and of 
legislation in the degree to which they were used to propound often quite 
detailed sets of rules and principles to govern future action.133 
By the end of the twelfth century, decretal letters were being assembled 
into collections.134 These collections were sometimes private endeavors, 
launched by ambitious practitioners who sought an awareness of the latest 
developments in the law.135 However, several were official products, 
issued by the pope as rules meant to bind all of Christendom. 
The most important collection for the purposes of understanding the 
development of canon law during the classical period is the Liber extra, 
which was the principal decretal collection issued by Pope Gregory IX in 
1234.136 Called “extra” because it was intended to embrace the law that 
had been promulgated since the appearance of Gratian’s Decretum and 
 126. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 112, at 49-51. 
 127. See CANON, supra note 8, at 25. 
 128. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition: An 
Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37, 43 (1991). 
 129. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, 
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625, 62-63 (1997). 
 130. See generally WOLFGANG P. MÜLLER, HUGUCCIO: THE LIFE, WORKS, AND THOUGHT OF A 
TWELFTH-CENTURY JURIST (1994). 
 131. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 112, at 53. 
 132. See CANON, supra note 8, at 11. 
 133. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 112, at 53. 
 134. Id. at 53-55. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See CANON, supra note 8, at 10-14. 
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hence was “outside” that collection,137 Liber extra became the focal point 
for commentaries on the law during the thirteenth century, including those 
by Hostiensis (ca. 1200-71),138 Pope Innocent IV (reigned 1243-54),139 and 
Bernard of Parma (d. 1266).140 Liber extra was followed at the close of the 
thirteenth century by Liber sextus, issued by Pope Boniface VIII in 1298, 
the Clementine Constitutions, a collection of Pope Clement V’s decrees 
promulgated in 1317, and the Extravagantes Johannis XXII (literally, “the 
wandering decrees of John XXII”), privately published between 1325 and 
1327.141 
Helmholz’s intention is to understand the animating spirit of this body 
of law during its years of flowering in the twelfth through fourteenth 
centuries. He goes about this task as an investigative scientist might by 
assembling data, which he culled from a careful examination of the 
sources in a series of thirteen discrete fields of study—from ordination, to 
provision for the poor, to baptism, to blasphemy, to double jeopardy, to 
excommunication, and other topics in-between. To gain a sense of 
Helmholz’s method and his success, one might select for closer scrutiny 
three of the topics he considers in the course of his study: canonical 
elections; the position and powers of the papacy in canon law; and the 
relationship of the clerical and lay powers. 
Election had been the ancient means by which leaders in the Church 
were chosen.142 The third-century North African bishop Cyprian of 
Carthage borrowed from Roman electoral vocabulary to ascribe to the 
entire ecclesial community a role in the selection of the community’s 
leadership.143 Pope Celestine I (422-432) wrote that “no bishop should be 
imposed on those unwilling to have him. The consent and ardent desire of 
the clergy, the people, and the nobility are required [for episcopal 
election].”144 Pope Leo the Great (440-461) declared that “one who is to 
 137. Id. at 12-13. 
 138. Author of a Summa and a Lectura on the Liber extra, as well as some shorter works. See 
BRUNDAGE, supra note 112, at 214. 
 139. One of the greatest legal minds of his or any time, Innocent wrote his Apparatus on the Liber 
extra during what spare time he had during his tumultuous pontificate. See id. at 225-26. 
 140. A professor at the University of Bologna, Bernard authored the Glossa ordinaria to the Liber 
extra. The “ordinary gloss” was a kind of semi-official commentary on the law in that it usually was 
copied together with manuscripts of the law itself. See id. at 210. 
 141. See id. at 197-99. 
 142. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Roots of a Democratic Church Polity in the History of Canon Law: 
The Case of Elections in the Church, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANON LAW SOCIETY OF AMERICA 
150, 153-60 (1998). 
 143. Id. at 155. 
 144. Id. at 159. 
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govern over all ought to be chosen by all.”145 Mass outpourings of popular 
support played key roles in the election of leading bishops, such as St. 
Martin of Tours (elected ca. 370-372) and St. Ambrose of Milan (elected 
374).146 
This ancient pattern remained a part of the lived experience of the 
Church and was part of the ecclesial heritage the reforming party gathered 
around Gregory VII wished to restore. The reformers, however, while 
desirous of re-establishing the old practice of ecclesial election, also 
sought rigorously to liberate this process from “any secular desire.”147 
Secular influence, in the context of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
meant selection by princes, and the reformers most certainly did not wish 
to open the door to that possibility.148 
Helmholz relates in careful detail the story of how secular influence 
came to be excluded from the election process in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.149 When Gratian turned to organize the election law that had 
grown up over the preceding thousand years of ecclesial life, he was 
confronted with some conflicting principles and ideas. He dealt first with 
the suggestion that a bishop might be able to designate his own 
successor,150 demonstrating through a series of careful distinctions that 
texts that seemingly suggested a bishop might take such a step were really 
the result of singular occurrences. In this way, the norm—bishops were to 
be rigorously excluded from taking such an action—was not only upheld 
but reinvigorated.151 
Gratian dealt as well with the proposition that princes might have the 
final say in naming bishops. True, Gratian conceded, such events had 
taken place historically, but they also were the result of unique factors—
princes, in particular times and places, had been given the privilege of 
filling episcopal vacancies, but these privileges had been abused and were 
now lost to the lay authority.152 Although the method Gratian employed in 
resolving these contradictory experiences and ideas—an intense 
preoccupation with contextualization and an effort to distinguish 
conflicting sources as singular instances deviating from an unchanging 
norm—might be criticized today, Helmholz notes that “Gratian’s 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 157-59. 
 147. See CANON, supra note 8, at 36. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 33-60. 
 150. Id. at 39-41. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 42-45. 
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technique . . . was unquestionably one of the common ways in which he 
and other canonists were able to reconcile conflicting and inconvenient 
texts.”153 
Helmholz continues to pursue his story of the evolution of election law 
in the thirteenth century. Thirteenth-century election law was preoccupied 
intensely with establishing rules to prevent the secular order from 
intruding on an ecclesiastical function. Indeed, the right to vote—the ius 
eligendi—itself was conceptualized as a spiritual right the possession and 
exercise of which was barred entirely to lay persons.154 Helmholz 
examines the further elaboration of the rule against lay participation and 
considers a variety of other issues as well, such as the necessity of actually 
gathering the electors in a single place, the proper forms of election, and 
the methods to be used in voting and in counting the votes.155 
Helmholz further reviews two special issues: the problem of the maior 
et sanior pars and postulation to the Holy See. The rule that election had 
to be by the maior et sanior pars—“the greater and sounder part”—of the 
electoral body was a countermajoritarian rule that had been a part of canon 
law from the early middle ages.156 The idea was that one had to win not 
only the “greater part” of the electoral body’s support, but also the 
approval of the group’s “sounder part.” Helmholz cautions that a modern 
reader may find the rules for discovering who constituted the sounder part 
“exasperating.”157 It was not a simple matter of measuring and counting 
numbers, but a process of determining who possessed greater “authority,” 
“zeal,” and “merit.”158 One could expect this sort of subjectivity to 
introduce grounds for controversy into the law, and, in fact, the number of 
electoral disputes found in the Liber extra testifies to the intense struggles 
that must have taken place.159 
Postulation also presented special problems. Where a suitable 
candidate could not be found, an electoral body had the authority to 
 153. Id. at 45. 
 154. See, for instance, Bernard of Parma, Glossa ordinaria, X.2.1.3, v. connexa (distinguishing 
among three large categories of rights: (1) spiritual rights that were proper only to the clerical order, 
(2) temporal rights, which were to be enjoyed by the lay order, and (3) rights connected to the spiritual, 
which might be enjoyed by both orders). On the ius eligendi as a spiritual right, see, for instance, 
X.1.6.51 (ruling illegal as an infringement on the liberty of the Church an arrangement by which a lay 
patron might select one of two candidates presented to him for office). 
 155. See CANON, supra note 8, at 46-52. 
 156. See Reid, supra note 142, at 167-68. 
 157. See CANON, supra note 8, at 54. 
 158. Id. at 53. 
 159. See the decretals in DECRETALES GREGORII IX, Liber I, Tit. VI, in 2 CORPUS IURIS 
CANONICI, supra note 122, cols. 48-96. 
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postulate—essentially, ask permission of one’s superior—that someone 
not otherwise eligible to be elected be named to the vacant post.160 The 
principle at work, Helmholz notes, was that in postulation “the superior 
exercised a power to dispense from the canons that dealt with the elector’s 
qualifications.”161 The decision whether to honor the postulation, usually 
on the basis of the utility of the Church, or to reject it, rested not on the 
rights of the postulant but on the good grace of the superior.162 
The larger point Helmholz is making in his treatment of election law is 
to demonstrate the victory of Gregorian reformist ideals. Election was 
chosen as the means by which offices were filled in imitation of the 
ancient Church, but this would be election in which secular influence was 
to be excluded rigorously. Gradually, as the rules grew complex and 
subjective, the way was opened to greater centralization of the nomination 
process.163 Being the court of last resort in resolving such disputes, it was 
only natural that the papacy would come to claim the power to fill 
vacancies.164 
The papacy as a lawmaking institution also came to occupy an exalted 
status as the result of the Gregorian Revolution. From the earliest days of 
the Church, Rome had occupied a privileged place in the governance of 
the Church in virtue of the ministry and martyrdom in that City of both St. 
Peter and St. Paul.165 For instance, when the Corinthian Church fell into 
dispute at the end of the first century, it was the Roman Church that took it 
upon itself to try to repair the breach.166 Pope Leo the Great, in the fourth 
century, dressed these ancient Roman prerogatives in legal language when 
he argued that the pope occupied the position of the “unworthy heir of St. 
Peter.”167 In this way, Leo both laid claim to the special place filled by St. 
Peter and thereby established to his satisfaction the preeminence of Rome 
in the governance of the Church, although he also distanced himself from 
the Apostle’s personal merits—the latter an impossible role to fill.168 
Leo’s lofty vision for the papacy was not always realized in the course 
 160. See CANON, supra note 8, at 56-58.  
 161. Id. at 57. 
 162. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Thirteenth-Century Canon Law and Rights: The Word ius and Its 
Range of Subjective Meanings, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 295, 333-40 (1996). 
 163. See CANON, supra note 8, at 58-60. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See WILLIAM J. LA DUE, THE CHAIR OF SAINT PETER: A HISTORY OF THE PAPACY (1999). 
 166. See First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, translated in 1 THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS 3 
(T.E. Page & W.H.D. Rouse eds., Kirsopp Lake trans., 1912). 
 167. See generally Walter Ullmann, Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy, 11 J. THEOLOGICAL 
STUD. 25 (1960). 
 168. Id. at 33-35. 
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of the early Middle Ages. Indeed, for much of the ninth and tenth 
centuries, the papacy sank into a kind of feudal squalor, as competing 
Roman families found it to be one more object to fight over in their 
seemingly endless struggles for advantage and power.169 It was to drain 
this swamp that the papal reform movement, led by Pope Gregory VII, 
was launched.170 
The reform movement in turn promoted an even more lofty vision of 
the papacy. In his Dictatus Papae, the “sayings of the pope,” Gregory VII 
declared that “the Roman bishop alone is by right called universal,” that 
“to him alone is it permitted to make new laws according to the needs of 
the times,” and that “no judgment of his may be revised by anyone, and 
. . . he alone may revise [the judgments] of all.”171 In the course of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, popes and canonists built a structure of 
papal sovereignty that at once exalted the authority of the pope—in the 
fullness of his power (plenitudo potestatis), he might even turn circles into 
squares, went one maxim172—but that also set some constitutional limits 
on his authority.173 
Helmholz takes for granted this historical background and focuses his 
own analysis on the development of one aspect of papal authority: the 
pope’s power to issue privileges dispensing from the ordinary operation of 
the law, thereby, in effect, creating special rights possessed by given 
individuals or entities in derogation of the law.174 Indeed, privileges were 
defined variously as a “private law” (privata lex),175 or “a special or 
private right contrary to the common law” (et quidem privatum sive 
singulare ius contra commune indultum).176 
Helmholz commences his analysis of papal privileges with the 
treatment found in Gratian’s Decretum.177 Gratian saw the question, in the 
first instance, as implicating the papal power to alter the ancient law of the 
Church.178 He mustered a series of sources that suggested popes should 
 169. See EAMON DUFFY, SAINTS AND SINNERS: A HISTORY OF THE POPES 82-87 (1997). 
 170. Id. at 87-99. 
 171. See BERMAN, supra note 9, at 96. For other sayings of the Pope, see supra note 121. 
 172. For this maxim, see CANON, supra note 8, at 314. 
 173. An important study of the constitutional limitations the canonists set on the papal office is 
BRIAN TIERNEY, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCILIAR THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MEDIEVAL 
CANONISTS FROM GRATIAN TO THE GREAT SCHISM (enl. ed. 1998). 
 174. See CANON, supra note 8, at 312-13. 
 175. See HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA, lib. I, tit. “De rescriptis et eorum interpretatione,” sec. 13. 
 176. Id. at lib. V, tit. “De privilegio,” sec. 1. 
 177. See CANON, supra note 8, at 316-21. 
 178. See C. 25, q. 1, cc. 1-16. 
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rarely, if ever, take this step.179 Gratian, however, was not content with this 
recitation of authority, and proceeded, in his usual fashion, to answer the 
authorities he had compiled. Fundamentally, he noted, “[t]he Roman 
Church was the ‘heart and head’ of all churches. It was the organ of the 
Church that God had designated as possessing the power to establish 
statuta.”180 Gratian proposed to model the legislative authority of the pope 
on the power that Jesus Christ claimed over the law.181 The Gospel of 
Matthew declared that Jesus taught as one who had authority over the 
law.182 Other passages, however, made it clear that Jesus “had come to 
fulfill the law, not to destroy it, and he had shown this to be true by his 
own voluntary obedience to the law.”183 
The pope, Gratian asserted, occupied the same position with respect to 
the canon law. The pope was not obliged to obey the law, although 
through his obedience “the law itself would be exalted by his example.”184 
However, by conceding that the pope had power over the law, and that he 
might vary the law’s applicability in individual instances to promote the 
cause of justice, Gratian opened the door to the development of a law of 
papal privileges.185 
The decretalists of the thirteenth century further developed the claim of 
the pope to issue privileges. The decretalists, in particular, were required 
to confront an essential tension in the nature and function of papal 
privileges:186 privileges were an expression of papal fullness of power and 
created exceptions to the general law, but it also was taught that the pope, 
the source of all law and right, was not to be a source of injury to others.187 
What if a papal privilege, in conferring special benefits or status on one 
group, simultaneously had the effect of injuring the rights of third parties? 
 179. See, for instance, C. 25, q. 1, c. 6 (in which it is stated that while the papacy has the power to 
make new laws, it is the obligation of the pope to defend what has been laid down, “even at the 
expense of his spirit and blood” (usque ad animam et sanguinem). Cf. CANON, supra note 8, at 317. 
 180. See CANON, supra note 8, at 317. 
 181. Id. at 317-18. 
 182. See Matthew 7:29. 
 183. See CANON, supra note 8, at 317. 
 184. Id. at 318. 
 185. Id. at 318-20. 
 186. Id. at 323. 
 187. See, e.g., Bernard of Parma, Glossa ordinaria, X.1.2.12, v. confirmatione: “Per tales 
confirmationes non intelligit Papa iuri alicuius derogare . . . Quia inde non debet nasci iniuria unde 
iura oriuntur” [“Through such confirmations the Pope is not understood to derogate from another’s 
right . . . Because injury ought not to arise from the source of laws/rights”]. See also X.1.31.12, v. nec 
esse debuit: “Ne inde nascuntur iniuriae, unde iura nascuntur” [“Injuries are not to arise from the 
source of law/rights”]. 
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Helmholz studies this issue at length.188 In practice, Helmholz makes 
clear, the canonists worked out a detailed set of rules that was 
systematized only gradually in order to protect both papal power and the 
settled rights and expectations of third parties.189 Papal privileges, 
Helmholz makes clear, was a vehicle by which “the popes were expressing 
sweeping claims to universal sovereignty over the government of the 
church . . .”190, but also a means “for building up the good order of the 
church, not for tearing it apart.”191 
At the same time canonists and popes collaborated to build an elaborate 
structure of papal sovereignty, powerful temporal rulers like Henry II of 
England and Philip Augustus of France also were using the law to bind 
together disparate corners of their kingdoms.192 The claims of popes and 
kings during this time often came into conflict. The conflict was not new; 
indeed, it is built into Christianity itself. Jesus Christ, after all, was 
recorded as saying “[r]ender therefore unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.”193 
This dualism has been at the heart of the relationship between the 
Christian movement and the temporal world from the very beginning. It 
gained classic expression in the artfully ambiguous letter of Pope Gelasius 
I to the Emperor Anastasius at the end of the fourth century: “Two there 
are, august emperor,” Gelasius began, “by which this world is chiefly 
ruled, the sacred authority [auctoritas] of the priesthood and the royal 
power [potestas].”194 
This view of the relationship of secular and spiritual powers, however, 
came to be challenged frontally in the course of the Gregorian 
Revolution.195 The Dictatus Papae represented the spirit of the reformers 
who came to dominate the writings of Church leaders in the late eleventh 
and twelfth centuries.196 This view was worked into a well-refined theory 
in the course of the thirteenth century. Pope Innocent IV’s commentary on 
the decretal Quod super his can be taken as an example of the exalted view 
the papacy took of itself during this time.197 This commentary rightfully is 
 188. See CANON, supra note 8, at 322-38. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 312. 
 191. Id. at 331. 
 192. On England, see BERMAN, supra note 9, at 434-59; on France, see BERMAN, supra note 9, at 
461-77. 
 193. Matthew 22:21. 
 194. See TIERNEY, supra note 117, at 13. 
 195. See CANON, supra note 8, at 339-43. 
 196. Id. at 340-41. 
 197. See Innocent IV, Apparatus super libros quinque decretalium ad X.3.34.8 v. pro defensione. 
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praised as creating the doctrine that non-Christians as well as Christians 
have a basic right of self-governance.198 However, it also must be pointed 
out that Innocent also made the pope the ultimate judge of whether 
Christian and non-Christian societies and regimes alike conformed to the 
dictates of the natural law.199  
Helmholz is careful to point out that the hierocratic view that came to 
predominate in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries never vanquished the 
older Gelasian dualism. Rather, the two principles forged a kind of 
coexistence, although the dualistic view occupied the weaker position.200 
In a world in which the canon law taught that any bishop might 
excommunicate a king, however, quite clearly, “it must follow as a matter 
of logical deduction that all kings held their positions subject to oversight 
by the priestly power.”201 
It is in this context that Helmholz wishes to pursue the implications of 
a question of both practical and theoretical import, namely:  
[T]he question of the extent to which temporal courts were bound to 
respect and, when necessary, actually to enforce the sentences of 
ecclesiastical courts. Were the rulers of the world required to wield 
the secular sword at the bidding of the church?  
 The more exact legal question was whether the canon law 
required a temporal ruler and his courts to obey the decisions of an 
ecclesiastical court.202 
 198. See JAMES MULDOON, POPES, LAWYERS, AND INFIDELS: THE CHURCH AND THE NON-
CHRISTIAN WORLD 1250-1550, 6-14 (1979). 
 199. See Innocent IV, supra note 197, at X.3.34.8 v. pro defensione: “Sed bene tamen credimus, 
quod Papa qui est vicarius iesu Christi, potestatem habet non tantum super Christianos, sed etiam super 
omnes infideles, cum enim Christus habuerit super omnes potestatem . . . [“But we nevertheless 
believe, that the Pope who is the Vicar of Jesus Christ, has power not only over Christians but also 
over all infidels, since Christ has power over all . . .”]. 
 200. See CANON, supra note 8, at 342. Helmholz describes the relationship between the two 
viewpoints:  
By the time the classical canon law was being formulated in the twelfth century . . . the 
Gelasian position had become distinctly the weaker alternative from the vantage point of high 
fliers within the church. It was not dead, of course. It had tradition and currency within the 
canon law itself; it retained its hold within the society of literate laymen; and it continued to 
be useful for many purposes to the canonists themselves. But the rise of theocratic ways of 
thinking about affairs of church and state had put a different complexion on the whole 
subject. 
Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 343. 
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The medieval Church, Helmholz makes clear, claimed for itself the 
power to pronounce coercive sanctions against wrongdoers, and premised 
this claim on scriptural authority.203 “Had not Moses rightly put to death 
those who worshiped the golden calf [Exod. 32:27-29]?”204 At the same 
time, the canonists limited the extent to which the Church might rely upon 
coercion. The Church might never directly impose the death penalty,205 
and, so far as other coercive sanctions were concerned, spiritual measures 
always should be applied before any resort to temporal sanctions.206 The 
imposition of temporal sanctions, in turn, required the cooperation of the 
secular realm.207 
Helmholz commences his analysis of the issue of cooperation at the 
level of theory: on what basis did the Church seek the assistance of the 
secular “arm,” as it was frequently called?208 Even the Gelasian “two 
powers” model of church/state relations permitted the Church to call upon 
the state where required. Helmholz traces this tradition back to Roman law 
sources, such as a provision of Justinian’s Codex that called on imperial 
officials to enforce the decisions of episcopal courts, where litigants had 
freely sought a hearing before the bishop.209 The medieval canonists 
viewed this text as a “confirmation of the principle that the temporal 
sword had been instituted so that it might come to the assistance of the 
spiritual.”210 
The hierocratic model of church/state relations, much in vogue in the 
thirteenth century, moved even more forcefully in the direction of 
requiring the state to come to the aid of the Church in the imposition of 
coercive sanctions. Explaining the logic at work, Helmholz states: 
Assuming that the spiritual power had really delegated its temporal 
sword to the state, as the “Gregorian” theory held it to have done, 
the conclusion followed that the temporal judges had a duty simply 
to enforce the ecclesiastical court’s judgment. They were agents. To 
 203. Id. at 346. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 348. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Helmholz explains: “[C]ourts could not normally invoke corporal sanctions, and they could 
never themselves issue a sentence of death. It might easily happen that stronger medicine would be 
required than spiritual sanctions and that the secular powers would have a monopoly on that 
medicine.” Id. at 350. 
 208. Id. at 351-56. 
 209. See CODE JUST. 1.4.8. Cf. CANON, supra note 8, at 352 (citing this text). 
 210. See CANON, supra note 8, at 352. 
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them belonged nothing but “the pure and simple execution” of the 
decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals.211 
This theoretical claim was simply too great for European monarchs and 
princes to swallow.212 Helmholz notes that because European rulers could 
not accept this assertion efforts were made to temper the logic of the 
unadulterated hierocratic view.213 Helmholz notes, however, that “[n]o 
definitive consensus” on a variety of theoretical compromises was ever 
achieved.214 
In actual practice, Helmholz continues, ecclesiastical and secular courts 
reached a modus vivendi. In various parts of Europe, secular courts agreed 
to provide the necessary teeth for ecclesiastical courts seeking to enforce 
their decrees.215 Thus in England, which Helmholz considers in detail, the 
bishop was allowed to seek a Chancery writ, known as a significavit, 
against anyone who remained excommunicated more than forty days.216 
According to the terms of the writ, the miscreant was to be imprisoned 
until such time as the ecclesiastical authority determined that the 
excommunication should be lifted.217 Remarkably, this was a system that 
remained in regular use into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, long 
after the Protestant Reformation had run its course.218 
The hierocratic theory associated with Pope Gregory VII received a 
severe reality check at the close of the thirteenth century in the 
confrontation between Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip the Fair of 
France.219 In a pair of decrees, known as Clericis Laicos and Unam 
Sanctam, Boniface boldly proclaimed the full measure of the hierorcatic 
theory in asserting the Church’s prerogatives in the French kingdom.220 
Philip responded with economic sanctions directed against Rome,221 a 
defense of his rights as a ruler predicated on Roman law,222 and, 
ultimately, with force, holding the pope briefly as a prisoner and 
 211. Id. at 352 (quoting Panormitanus, Commentaria, X.1.31.1, no. 12). 
 212. Id. at 353. 
 213. Id. at 354-55. 
 214. Id. at 355. 
 215. Id. at 358-60. 
 216. Id. at 358. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See TIERNEY, supra note 117, at 172-92. 
 220. See id. at 175-76, 188-89 (providing translated excerpts from these two decrees). 
 221. The king simply cut off the precious metal trade between his kingdom and Rome, a trade on 
which the pope was dependent. Id. at 174. 
 222. Id. at 181-82. 
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“roughing him up.”223 A few years after Boniface’s death, the papacy in 
fact would move to Avignon, in what is now southern France, where it 
could be kept under the watchful eye of the French king to the north. 
Despite this blunt challenge to the hierocratic theory, as Helmholz’s 
treatment makes clear, courts of canon law in many parts of Europe could 
continue to call upon the secular arm for the enforcement of decrees until 
the Reformation, and sometimes even later.224 The survival of the system, 
however, came to rest upon a compromise between canonists, who could 
not fully implement in practice their own most ambitious theories, and the 
monarchs of Europe who, at best, accepted Gelasian dualism, but who still 
looked to the Church as being crucial to the security of their crowns and 
essential to the vitality of their states.225 
The remainder of Helmholz’ work continues in this precise inductive 
manner, searching for the spirit of classical canon law in the elaborate 
structure of rules and rights, principles, and maxims which the canonists 
created and attempted to implement. His is a triumph of patient and 
exacting historical investigation. And what is that spirit of classical canon 
law? Helmholz finds it manifested in three overarching themes: “the 
independence of the clergy from secular control,”226 “the concern for salus 
animarum” [salvation of souls],227 and the requirement “to secure full 
justice for the unfortunate and to establish a system capable of enforcing 
their rights,” a task that was accomplished through the creation of a 
sophisticated body of poor relief law.228 These were the accomplishments 
of the system of canon law that was conceived in the papal revolution of 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries and that would endure for centuries. 
CONCLUSION 
John Maxcy Zane, Chicago lawyer, legal scholar, and narrator of the 
story of law,229 wrote in 1927 of “the traditions of Rome [that] govern our 
institutions today.”230 These traditions, Zane observed, have conferred on 
 223. Id. at 183-84. 
 224. See CANON, supra note 8, at 358-64. 
 225. Id. at 365. 
 226. Id. at 394. 
 227. Id. at 395. 
 228. Id. at 395-96. Cf. id. at 116-44 (examining the law of poor relief); BRIAN TIERNEY, 
MEDIEVAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN ENGLAND 
(1959). 
 229. See generally JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW (2d ed. 1998). For biographical 
details, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., Foreword to ZANE, supra, at xiii-xviii. 
 230. See JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE GRANDEUR THAT WAS ROME 1-2 (1927). 
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the West such basic legal forms as corporations and partnerships, the 
whole judicial process, including such elementary components as causes 
of actions and pleadings, and the whole basic constitutional order 
including “the state, the republic, [and] the people itself . . .”231 This 
Romanist tradition, embracing both the classical period and the middle 
ages, Zane concludes grandly, “continues to live in us, and will live among 
enlightened nations forevermore.”232 It is the force that gave life to the 
learned laws of the West, and its power remains alive today. We are in the 
debt of Alan Watson and Richard Helmholz for their own learned 
expositions of this subject. 
 231. Id. at 14-15. 
 232. Id. at 75. 
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